I'm gathering materials for a future thesis on counter-terrorism and futures studies. I'll be posting some quick comments on articles, books and interviews I come across.

∙ Graham Fuller has written a monograph, 'Islamists in the Arab World: The Dance Around Democracy' (abstract and PDF) that is a model of clarity in describing complex social phenomena, and placing them in a cultural and historical context. I've browsed my copy of Fuller's The Future Of Islam (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), and will hopefully get time to read it over the Australian summer.

∙ The Heritage Foundation, the leading US-based conservative think tank, has some interesting talks on national security issues (however, the really interesting ones on intelligence reform are never placed online). Dr. Mary Habeck's talk 'Following the Method of Mohammad: Jihadist Strategies in the War on Terror' (12 August 2004; abstract and video stream) is a case in point. Habeck is at her best when she explains how counterterrorism scholars analyze New Terrorism groups. She is on more shaky ground, evident in the Q&A session, when trying to mobilize moderate Muslims to act on her behalf: academic scholars still have to get their facts right, and acknowledge frames of interpretation, lest they stray into agitative propaganda (some of her audience objected to how the lecture title misrepresents the global majority of peaceful Muslims). The controversy over Yale denying Habeck tenure went unmentioned. Lawrence Auster's article 'The Key to Jihadist Ideology and Strategy' summarizes Habeck's major point that Jihadist actions must be understood as rational (for instance the Madrid bombings as a symbolic attack against a near enemy that has occupied Muslim lands, the Jihadists believe, for centuries).

One of Dr. Habeck's best observations is this: 'To understand each attack, you have to get into the mindset of the group that carried out that attack, and not try to make broad generalizations about Jihadis or extremists or fundamentalists. These are very different people, very different groups, with very different arguments about how they should be carrying out their warfare. Understanding their arguments, in fact, means you have to understand their ideology, and, in some cases, understand the theological arguments they are having with the rest of the Islamic world.' (9:24-9:43 minutes). Dr. Habeck makes a clear case for values systems analysis, and then talks about how long-term vision informs Al Qaeda's grand strategy (but without being aware, perhaps, of recent work on macrohistory).

Her analysis echoes Evan F. Kohlmann's new book Al-Qaida's Jihad In Europe: The Afghan-Bosnian Network (New York: Berg Publishers, 2004) on how contemporary groups use Muhammed's Hijra (flight from enemies and formation of a clandestine vanguard/religious elite) as a model for situational learning and inculcation of how to use Hazard. Kohlmann's book analyzes how Al Qaeda used the Balkans conflict 'to establish a European domestic infrastructure'. This ties with John Urry's description in Global Complexity (London: Polity Press, 2003), of how Bosnia and Kashmir, as conflict zones, draw in potential recruits and become territories for arms dealers. Kohlmann's thoughts on Al-Qaeda infighting also echoes Alan Collison's article 'Inside Al-Qaeda's Hard Drive' (Atlantic Monthly, September 2004, pp. 55-70), which features Al-Qaeda internal documents found on a laptop.

The introduction by Jim Phillips, a member of the Committee on the Present Danger, is also revealing.

'Some of the madrassahs were virtually 'jihad factories' that generated a steady stream of radicalized young males to flock to fight Jihad, or Holy War, in Afghanistan', Phillips notes (3:40-3:50 minutes). The industrial-era metaphor of 'jihad factories' evokes the specter of dehumanization. Yet it also fails (perhaps due to the short time) to explain the important role that madrassahs play in development politics, nor how Jihad is inculcated as a religious goal.

'But we need to also remember we are in a war of ideas, for Binladenism will survive Bin Laden, and will survive long after he is captured or killed. It's important to remember that Bin Laden is not just a nihilistic terrorist, but he's an Islamic revolutionary who seeks to hijack Islam, and impose his totalitarian Islamic ideology on Muslims throughout the world' (4:11-4:40 minutes). Whilst he realizes the psychopolitical power of ideas, Phillips does not explain, as Jason Burke does in Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror (London: IB Taurus, 2003) that Al-Qaeda is a network of 'loose ties' held together by an underlying belief system (an all-controlling and centralized organization is a 'comforting myth', Burke claims). Graham Fuller's analysis, cited above, suggests that this will adapt as an Islamist-nationalist nexus forms in the Middle East, cross-bonded by anti-American rhetoric. The line 'Islamic revolutionary' may be a nod to Michael Scheuer's Through Our Enemies' Eyes (Brassey's Inc., 2003), whilst 'totalitarian Islamic ideology' alludes to Paul Berman's Terror And Liberalism (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2003). Berman's work has been influential on policymakers, just as Robert Kaplan's Balkan Ghosts ((New York: Vintage Books USA, 1994) was on the Clinton Administration (the 'ancient ethnic hatred' thesis critiqued by Michael Ignatieff and others).

Another of Phillips' quotes stood out: 'To win this war ultimately we must convince Muslims, through reasoning or the use of force, that totalitarian Islamic ideas have bad consequences---not just for us, but for them. To win this war of ideas we must first understand the ideas and strategy of the enemy (5:30-5:50 minutes). On the one hand, Phillips quotes Sun Tzu's Art of War. On the other, a US over-reaction to 'bad consequences' may create the 'slippery slope' to a dystopian future---exactly what I want to avoid.

On a side note, after watching about 100 hours of lectures, Heritage's John Hilbodt could probably do the introductions in his sleep (he does them so much). Someone ought to sample it (I can hear Cobain-style grunge distortion already . . .)